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GUARDIANSHIP ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
WHO HAVE SELECTED AN AGENT AS POWER OF




State guardianship statutes and court rules make reference to
existing agents under power of attorney documents, and the
power of attorney statutes recognize that a person may have
both an agent and a guardian.' An individual may designate, in
a power of attorney (POA) document, who shall be guardian if it
becomes necessary.2 However, in general, state laws do not
address the question of what happens when a person, who has
already signed a POA for healthcare and for all financial,
business, and legal decisions, is served with a complaint seeking
to have him or her declared incapacitated and seeking to have a
third party appointed as a guardian, also referred to as a
fiduciary. This article suggests that the choice of fiduciary is a
constitutionally-protected privacy and liberty interest, on which
the courts may not intrude, absent a compelling governmental
interest. The article explores the question of whether and when
the courts should dismiss guardianship actions when there is a
duly designated agent who has comprehensive authority and is
ready to serve.
. Linda S. Ershow-Levenberg is a member of the firm of Fink Rosner Ershow-
Levenberg, LLC, and is certified in Elder Law through the National Elder Law
Foundation, an ABA-recognized accrediting organization. She concentrates
her practice in planning and litigation of elder & disability law, estate planning
and estate administration.
1. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5503 (Supp. 2004); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4126 (West
Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8.4 (West 2004). (Statutes also refer to an agent as
an attorney-in-fact).
2. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5503(B) (Supp. 2004); ALA. CODE § 26-1-2(c)(2)
(Michie Supp. 2004); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4126 (West Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §




POWER OF ATTORNEY RELATIONSHIPS
Individuals have long had the right to sign a document
authorizing another person as agent to take actions on their
behalf. Known as a "power of attorney," the appointment was
valid only so long as the principal remained competent to
revoke it. Modem statutes created the "durable power of
attorney," which survives the incapacity of the principal,
commonly for the purpose of allowing the agent to make
healthcare decisions for the principal.3 The power granted to the
agent in a durable power to attorney may be limited to certain
transactions, or it may be plenary and comprehensive, covering
everything from insurance, to banking, to litigation. Gift
transfers of the principal's income or assets may not be made
absent express authority in the document.4
An individual is free to select the agent of his or her choice
as a POA and healthcare representative. The agent designated
by a principal is a fiduciary who owes a duty of loyalty and
good faith to his or her principal.5 It is this fiduciary status
which gives the principal comfort and confidence that the
named agent will act in his or her best interests.6 As the court
stated in Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, "[tihe confidence arising
from a principal-agent relationship is not charted on a one-way
street. Good faith works in both directions."7 Indeed, the
principal has legal recourse against the agent for the breach of
fiduciary duty.
One risk inherent in the POA lies in the fact that third
parties may rely upon the authority granted in a durable POA
until the third party has received actual notice of the revocation,
3. The durable power of attorney includes specific language such as "this power of
attorney shall not be affected by subsequent disability of the principal or lapse of time," see,
e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4124 (West Supp. 2005); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/2-1 to 2-
7 (West 1993); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5502 (West 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
46:2B-8.2 et seq. (West 2004).
4. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8.13(a) (West 2004).
5. Manna v. Pirrozzi, 130 A.2d 55, 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957); Hirsch v.
Schwartz, 209 A.2d 635, 639 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965); Tiernan v. Carasaljo Pines,
143 A.2d 892, 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958); Campagna v. U.S., 474 F. Supp. 573,
585 (D.N.J. 1979); CAL. PROB. CODE § 2101 (West Supp. 2005).




termination, or suspension of the authority granted (or actual
notice of the death of the principal).' By statute, such third
parties are typically indemnified for harm that may occur to the
principal from an otherwise authorized act by the agent.9 If the
agent, who has a fiduciary duty to the principal,10 abuses the
principal and breaches his or her fiduciary obligations, the
principal's sole recourse is against the agent. If the principal no
longer has the mental capacity to revoke the authorization and
sue the agent, some interested party must step in on behalf of
the violated principal." It is at this time that some guardianship
actions are appropriately initiated. Ultimately, the agent or
attorney-in-fact will be accountable to the guardian.12
GUARDIANSHIP ACTIONS
Guardianship is the legal mechanism under purview of the
courts in which a court appoints a person to take control of
decision-making and management for a person deemed no
longer competent to manage his or her affairs. 13 There may be
slight differences in procedure from state to state. Generally,
before appointing a guardian, the court must first adjudicate the
individual to be mentally incapacitated. 14 Once the court has
done so, the court must appoint a guardian for person or
property, or both. The appointment of a guardian strips the
individual of his or her rights and liberties, except to the extent
that those rights may be reserved for the person by the court,
and the guardian becomes the authorized decision-maker for the
incapacitated person. From then on, the guardian must file with
the court annual reports of health and welfare as well as annual
accountings.15 These documents can be obtained by interested
parties such as family members.'"
8. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8.5 (West 2004); Wis. STAT. § 243.07(4) (2003-2004).
9. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 155.50 (2003-2004) (specifically regarding healthcare POA).
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8.13 (West 2004).
11. E.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 243.07(6r), 243.10(8) (2003-2004).
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5503(A) (Supp. 2004); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
45/2-10 (West 1993); MICH. CoMP. LAW ANN. § 700.5503(1) (West 2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2B-8.13 (West 2004).
13. E.g. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2100-2112 (West Supp. 2005); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/13-5 (West 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:12-24 tol2-29 (West 2004); N.J. Ct. R.
4:86-1 et seq. (2005).
14. E.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 880.03, 880.12 (2003-2004).
15. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 880.25 (2003-2004) (regarding annual financial accountings).
16. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 243.07(6r) (2003-2004) (on review of the agent's performance).
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A guardianship action is initiated by filing a verified
complaint." Generally, the complaint must be accompanied at
the time of filing by affidavits of incapacity signed by at least
one licensed physician who has examined the individual within
thirty days of the filing date." The affidavits must be based on
findings that the person lacks the capacity to make decisions in
specific areas of life activity. The standards for determining
"incapacity" or "incompetency" are by no means black and
white and are beyond the scope of this article.
The plaintiff's verified complaint must state his or her
relationship to the alleged incapacitated person.19 Among other
things, the plaintiff must disclose the name and address of any
person appointed as POA or healthcare representative. 20 After a
complaint for guardianship is accepted and filed, the court
appoints an attorney for the alleged incapacitated person. 21
Counsel's role can be very challenging to fulfill. The attorney is
responsible for representing the client's wishes, if ascertainable
or if the client is competent (in the view of counsel) and for
representing the best interests of the client if he is not
competent.22
Among other things, the court-appointed counsel must
report on whether "less restrictive alternatives" exist such that
guardianship would not be necessary. 23 The plaintiff must serve
the next of kin and other interested parties. 24 Opposition to the
action may be filed either because a party denies that the
individual in question requires a guardian or because a party
objects to a certain person being appointed as guardian. 25 In
either case, litigation ensues and the private affairs of the alleged
incapacitated person become a part of the court record.
17. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-2-104 (2001).
18. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 880.33 (2003-2004).
19. N.J. Ct. R. 4:86-1 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-2-104 (2001).
20. N.J. Ct. R. 4:86-1 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 880.07 (2003-2004).
21. E.g., N.J. Ct. R. 4:86-4(b) (2005); WiS. STAT. § 880.33(2)(a) (2003-2004)
(proposed ward has right to counsel).
22. E.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 880.38 (regarding guardianship of an incompetent), 880.331
(2003-2004) (guardian ad litem represents best interests).
23. N.J. Ct. R. 4:86-4 (2005). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-127 (2001) (court
should impose least restrictive alternatives sua sponte).
24. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-106 (2001); WiS. STAT. § 880.08(1) (2003).




The selection of a fiduciary and healthcare representative is an
intrinsically personal matter that should be included among
protected liberty and privacy interests. As such, the courts
should not infringe on that right absent a compelling
governmental interest. There is a zone of privacy and liberty
protected by the Constitution with "the dignity of a fundamental
right."2 6 As one court noted:
It is the fundamental freedom from intrusion by
government derived by federal decisions from the
'penumbra' of several constitutional provisions,
including the right to receive information under the
free speech guarantee of the First Amendment,
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, the right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, the retained
rights of the people under the Ninth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.27
As with all constitutional rights, the right is not absolute, and it
may be regulated by a compelling governmental interest. 28
When privacy interests run up against the state's exercise of its
police power to protect the general public and safeguard high
ethical standards for a functioning, democratic government, the
privacy interest in question has often had to give way to the
larger public interest, such as drunk driving, fingerprinting of
applicants for real estate broker's licenses, state investigation of
alleged wrongdoing on part of government officials; and
disclosure of confidential financial information to casinos on
employment applications. These were the holdings of a series of
cases in New Jersey. However, where the police power is not
involved, and the interest is intrinsically personal, the
government's incursions have been curtailed by the courts.29
26. Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 323 A.2d 537, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd, 356
A.2d 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 383 A.2d 428 (N.J. 1978).
27. Lehrhaupt, 356 A.2d at 41, ajJ'd, 383 A.2d 428, (citing inter alia, Griswold v.
Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
28. G.P. v. Florida, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1062-1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
29. See, e.., Doe v. Boroih ofRrrinton, 729 F. Sipp. 376 (M N 1990) (accnrding
higher level of protection to the confidentiality of an individual's HIV positive status), and
Yeager v. Hackensack Water Co., 615 F. Supp. 1087 (D.N.J. 1985) (invalidating state law
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The courts need to be sensitive to the severe incursion into the
fundamental right of privacy which occurs when an unnecessary
guardianship action is prosecuted. The freedom to choose one's
companions and fiduciaries is intrinsic to this right of privacy.
For care, assistance, and management of daily life, an individual
should have the right to appoint an agent of his or her choice,
and a court should not overturn this choice by means of a
guardianship adjudication absent a compelling governmental
interest.30 This is particularly so in light of the deprivation of
liberty which can occur upon adjudication of incapacity: loss of
the right to marry, to vote, to sign documents with legal effect,
and to make a will, among other things.31
"[I]ntrusions into constitutionally protected areas must be
founded on a compelling state interest which overrides private
rights." 32  Some state constitutions impose upon state
government an affirmative obligation to protect fundamental
individual rights.33 The state courts are just as bound by these
principles as any other branch of government, and they may not
aid and abet the infringement of protected rights that would
result from a litigant's use of the courts.
IS A GUARDIANSHIP NECESSARY?
The burden of proof should rest with the plaintiff petitioning for
guardianship, and the threshold question should be whether he
or she has presented a prima facie case showing that
guardianship is necessary. The inquiry should not simply focus
on whether the person is currently incapacitated. I suggest that
to adequately safeguard protected privacy and liberty interests,
the facial sufficiency of the allegations is not enough. A court
should also satisfy itself of the necessity of the proceeding before
that authorized the water company to collect names of individuals residing in customers'
homes); Woodland v. City of Houston, 918 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Schwenk v.
Kavanaugh, 4 F. Supp. 2d 110 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
30. See Forst v. Fogel, 385 N.Y.S.2d 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding that severe
mental impairment and inability to care for oneself or one's property does not in and of itself
determine that a guardian must be appointed).
31. E.g., Estate of Bechtold, 376 A.2d 211, 213 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). See
also Lommason v. Washington Trust Co., 53 A.2d 175 (N.J. 1947).
32. Toms River Publ'g Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, Monmouth County, 316 A.2d
719, 723 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
33. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (specifically protecting privacy). See also MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 3.
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authorizing the case to go forward.3 If the complaint states that
there is a named agent, or if the answer to the complaint
indicates that there is a formally designated agent who can assist
the alleged incapacitated person if and when it becomes
necessary, the burden of proof should remain with the plaintiff
to come forward with the prima facie evidence showing that
there is still a need for a guardianship. The court could conduct
a hearing in limine and in camera to hear such evidence. This
would protect the due process and privacy rights of the alleged
incapacitated person.
If the documents signed by the principal are comprehensive
and authorize the agent to take all of the actions that may be
required on behalf of the principal, if and when such actions
become necessary, the principal will be fully protected. A
guardianship should be unnecessary. The court should not even
reach the issue of whether the principal is incapacitated.
There must be some reason other than mere incapacity to
warrant the filing and pursuit of a guardianship action. Further,
regardless of whether an individual is legally incapacitated, the
plaintiff in a guardianship action must have standing to initiate
the action.35 This principle is based on the common law rule that
a judicial determination of a person's mental incompetency may
not be made upon the application of a "mere stranger" to the
issue. 36 "A person with no actual legal or equitable interest may
not initiate proceedings to determine another's mental
incompetency." 37 When there is a comprehensive, available
power of attorney and an agent, the plaintiff, regardless of
familial relationship, is a "mere stranger" to the issue of the
principal's capacity.
A guardianship might be necessary in spite of there being
an authorized agent in certain situations. These situations
divide themselves into two categories: (1) the need to fill a void
34. See, e.g., In re Gottsmann, 48 A.2d 800 (N.J. Ch. 1946) (allegations of various
unhealthy behaviors found insufficient to warrant complaint to be accepted). See also In re
Clifford, 41 A. 356 (N.J. Ch. 1898) (where the alleged incapacitated person had no estate
and was in prison, the court refused to entertain an action to have that person declared
incapacitated or to permit the appointment of a guardian).
35. In re Oswald, 28 A.2d 299, 300 (N.J. Ch. 1942). See also In re Joseph P., 586
N.W.2d 52 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
36. In re Oswald, 28 A.2d at 300; Allison v. Walvoord, 819 S.W.2d 624, 626-627 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1991).
37. in re Tierney, 42i A.2d 6iu, 603-614 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), af'd, 426
A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
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unintentionally created and (2) the need to deal with imminent
risk of harm to the principal.
As to the first category, four situations present themselves:
(1) An individual may have signed a POA, but
neglected to appoint a healthcare representative. It
could become necessary to appoint a guardian of the
person to carry out medical treatment decisions.
(2) An individual may have signed nothing but a bank
account POA. It could become necessary to institute a
guardianship to sell real estate or carry out other major,
necessary transactions.
(3) The individual may have signed a POA which
lacked authority to make gift or trust transactions, yet
the current state of affairs suggests that had the
principal known of the necessity to include such
authority in the POA, he or she would have done so.
(4) The POA document may fail to designate a
successor. If the primary agent cannot function, a
guardianship might be needed.
If there is a designated healthcare representative as well as
an attorney-in-fact, there should be no need for a guardian
because all areas of decision-making authority are taken care of
in the documents that were signed.
The second category involves situations like the following:
the agent is known to be stealing money from the principal or
has abandoned the principal in his or her apartment where he or
she is starving to death. The conflicting tensions appear to be
the state's parens patriae power over incapacitated persons who
are at imminent risk of harm and the individual's ability to order
his or her own affairs to ward off state interference if he or she
does become incapacitated. I suggest that the government and
the courts should only become involved in replacing the chosen
agent with someone else, or placing the agent under control of
the court, if the plaintiff presents prima facie evidence showing
that the chosen agent is breaching his fiduciary duty to the
alleged incapacitated person. However, this does not mean that
a guardianship action can be instituted and then followed by a
fishing expedition to see whether there is substantive evidence
to substantiate it ab initio.
Once the court knows that there is a bona fide POA and a
90 [Vol. 7
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healthcare representative in place, entertaining a guardianship
action can virtually force the invalidation of a POA, which was
signed as a precaution against such intrusions. Ostensibly, if
there is a designated POA and a healthcare representative, and
the plaintiff has presented no prima facie evidence of harm, less
restrictive alternatives do exist, and there is no need to proceed
with the action.38 Individuals sign powers of attorney and
appointments of healthcare representative as insurance in case
they do become incapacitated. They choose someone whom
they trust and who will be there to take care of them and make
decisions for them if the time comes. They should be allowed to
order their personal affairs however they see fit, without undue
interference by a third party or by the state, provided that their
agents are reasonably fulfilling their fiduciary obligations.
Absent evidence that the agent is breaching fiduciary obligations
or is causing physical, mental, or financial harm, a third party
should have no say in the choice that the principal made as to
her agent. Yet, the mere filing of a bare-bones guardianship
complaint allows a plaintiff to inject the court's oversight into a
personal arrangement between the principal and his chosen
agent, at considerable cost to the principal who must defend his
or her choice.
By allowing the pursuit of a guardianship case where none
of the above problems exist, the courts risk undue interference
with privacy and liberty without a compelling governmental
interest. The courts should therefore exercise caution and
restraint in allowing such cases to be litigated. Judges should
consider dismissing certain guardianship complaints to prevent
such unwarranted intrusions. The guardianship statutes and
court rules are intended to be used as a shield against frivolous
actions, not as a sword to be wielded by anyone who is upset by
a citizen's choice of agent. In deciding not to eliminate the
standing requirements discussed above, one New Jersey court
expressed the issue well when it stated:
The public policy which gave birth to the standing
requirements as to incompetency actions is clearly to
38. In re Waxman, 466 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (where incapacitated
person had irrevocable trust to provide for his medical and living expenses, there was no
need for appointment of guardian); cf In re Roche, 687 A.2d 349 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1996) (invalidated the incapacitated person's POA for healthcare and appointed a guardian




protect individuals from unwanted interference in their
affairs; to shield an individual from the necessity of
defending himself or herself from frivolous or insidious
incompetency charges. It is the opinion of this court
that the general need for such protection has not
diminished; .... .3
CONCLUSION
The intrusion on personal privacy resulting from guardianship
litigation, and the deprivation of liberty which can result from
the adjudication of incapacity, should raise the courts' scrutiny
to ensure that these actions not be lightly pursued. In the
absence of patent verified allegations of harm or risk by the
designated agent, the courts should be cautious in allowing such
litigation to proceed. 40
39. In re Tierney, 421 A.2d at 615.
40. In matter of H.P., an alleged incapacitated person, the New Jersey Equity Court
ultimately dismissed the guardianship action as the plaintiff presented no evidence to
invalidate the power of attorney.
92 [Vol. 7
